GARCIA
VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
For
resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29,
2011 under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which
seeks to annul and set aside the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9,
2011, promulgated by the Office of the President.
On October
13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), Col. Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a
Restriction to Quarters1 containing
the following:
1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief
of Staff, AFP to the undersigned dtd 12 October 2004, you are hereby placed
under Restriction to Quarters under guard pending investigation of your case.
2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to leave your
quarters without the expressed permission from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP.
3. In case you need immediate medical attention or required by the
circumstance to be confined in a hospital, you shall likewise be under guard.
Thereafter,
a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court
Martial NR 2 presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.),
enumerating the following violations allegedly committed by petitioner:
CHARGE 1:
VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND
GENTLEMAN).
SPECIFICATION
1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing
assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth for the
year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to
Republic Act 6713, such as the following: cash holdings with the Armed Forces
Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six
million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received
from AFPSLAI from June 2003 to December 2003 in the amount of one million three
hundred sixty-five thousand pesos (P1,365,000.00); dollar peso deposits with
Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro
Universal Bank, Bank of Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and
Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s
names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota
Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda
Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ
582 and 2001 Toyota RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct
unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
SPECIFICATION
2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing
assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the
year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to
Republic Act 6713, such as the following: his cash holdings with the Armed
Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of
six million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend
received form AFPSLAI in June 2002 and December 2002 in the total amount of one
million four hundred thirty-five thousand pesos (1,435,000.00), dollar and peso
deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation, Banco
de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's
Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and
his wife’s names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr.
WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr.
UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC-134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van
with Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001 Toyota RAV 4
Utility
Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
SPECIFICATION
3: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, while in the active military
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and
unlawfully violate his solemn oath as a military officer to uphold the
Constitution and serve the people with utmost loyalty by acquiring and holding
the status of an immigrant/permanent residence of the United
States of
America in violation of the State policy governing public officers, thereby
causing dishonor and disrespect to the military professional and seriously
compromises his position as an officer and exhibits him as morally unworthy to
remain in the honorable profession of arms.
CHARGE II:
VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND
MILITARY DISCIPLINE).
SPECIFICATION
1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of
his true assets in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the
year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to
Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
SPECIFICATION
NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of
his true assts in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the
year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to
Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
After
trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the
findings or the After-Trial Report5of the same court was read to the petitioner.
The report contains the following verdict and sentence:
MGEN CARLOS
FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the court in closed session upon secret written ballot
2/3 of all the members present at the time the voting was taken concurring the
following findings. Finds you:
On
Specification 1 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land
Bank of the Phils, dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro,
Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and
Planters Development Bank.
On
Specification 2 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land
Bank of the Phils, dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro,
Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and
Planters Development Bank.
On
Specification 3 of Charge 1 – Guilty
On
Specification 1 of Charge 2 – Guilty
On
Specification 2 of Charge 2 – Guilty
And again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 all the
members are present at the time the votes was taken concurrently sentences you
to be dishonorably [discharged] from the service, to forfeit all pay and
allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard labor at such place
the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years.
IV.
RECOMMENDED ACTION:
The period
of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall be credited in his favor and deducted
from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement
will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is
less than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer
appropriate.
After six
(6) years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010,
petitioner was released from the Camp Crame Detention Center.8
The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of
the AFP and acting as the Confirming Authority under the Articles of War,
confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court Martial against petitioner.
Consequently,
on September 15, 2011, respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin,
issued a Memorandum10 to
the Chief of Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the Confirmation of Sentence
in the Court Martial Case of People of the Philippines Versus Major General
Carlos Flores Garcia AFP.
On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and
continues to be detained at the National Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau
of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and
petition for habeas corpus, alternatively but were denied.
Thus, the
only issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, which was properly filed with this Court, is whether the
Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence dated
September 9, 2011.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT
ARTICLE 29 FO THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS VIOLATIVE OF FEQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS.
RULING:
Petitioner
raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try his
case. According to him, the said jurisdiction ceased ipso facto upon his
compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists that the Office of the President had
acted without jurisdiction in issuing the confirmation of his sentence.
This Court
finds the above argument bereft of merit.
It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service
of the AFP in March 2003 and 2004, when the alleged violations were committed.
The charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and he was arraigned on November 16,
2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until the time
petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the
case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon
the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.21 Therefore,
petitioner's retirement on November 18, 2004 did not divest the General Court
Martial of its jurisdiction.
Under
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 10.
Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary.
In
connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by the
Office of the President directing him to be confined for two (2) years in the
penitentiary had already been fully served in view of his preventive
confinement which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore, according to him, the
Office of the President no longer has the authority to order his confinement in
a penitentiary. On the other hand, the OSG opines that petitioner cannot
legally demand the deduction of his preventive confinement in the service of
his imposed two-year confinement in a penitentiary, because unlike our Revised
Penal Code29 which
specifically mandates that the period of preventive imprisonment of the accused
shall be deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the Articles of War and/or
the Manual for Courts-Martial do not provide for the same deduction in the
execution of the sentence imposed by the General Court Martial as confirmed by
the President in appropriate cases.
On the
above matter, this Court finds the argument raised by the OSG unmeritorious and
finds logic in the assertion of petitioner that Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code can be made applicable in the present case.
In Marcos
v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,31 this
Court ruled that a court-martial case is a criminal case and the General Court
Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the same case, this
Court clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court" used in
Section 1732 of
the 1935 Constitution prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in
any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused
of an offense committed in relation to his office. This Court held:
We are of
the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words
"any court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial
case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of
our Constitution.
Hence, as
extensively discussed above, the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest
sense of the word and acts as a criminal court. On that premise, certain
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as those that are not provided in
the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary.
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 10.
Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary.
A special law is defined as a penal law which
punishes acts not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code.34 In
the present case, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman (96th Article of War) and Violation of the
97th Article of War, or Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military
Discipline, both of which are not defined and penalized under the Revised Penal
Code. The corresponding penalty imposed by the General Court Martial, which is
two (2) years of confinement at hard labor is penal in nature. Therefore,
absent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the
implementation and execution of the General Court Martial's decision, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be
applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner's period of confinement to his
sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review
Considering that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October
2004, the entire period of his confinement since 18 October 2004 will be
credited in his favor. Consequently, his two (2) year sentence of confinement
will expire on 18 October 2006.
Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal
Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.37 It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner.38 The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through the state's duly-constituted authorities.39 In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely
on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.40 It,
however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
it applies equally to all members of the same class.41 "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."42 In
the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of those who have been
convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to them.
Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of
offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil
courts. Furthermore, following the same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled
to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.43 It
must be remembered that the provisions of the Articles of War which the
petitioner violated are penal in nature.
WHEREFORE,
the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, AFP (Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED. However, applying the provisions of
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the time within which the petitioner was
under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by
the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same
law.
SO ORDERED.
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